In the problem of locating multiple public facilities studied by Beviá (2002, 2005), we offer simple necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency, decentralizability of efficient decisions in a game of community division and local public goods provision, and a constructive algorithm for efficient and consistent decisions.
Introduction
Barberà and Beviá (2002, 2005 ) introduce a notion of consistency between a global decision governing community-wise consumptions and local decisions by individual communities. They consider a simple model of community division and location of (local) public facilities. 1 A location is chosen from a real line. Members of a community have single-peaked preferences over the line and the size of the community does not affect members' welfare (no congestion effect). Given a set of agents, their preferences, and a fixed number of communities to form, a social choice function determines a community division and locations of public facilities for individual communities. The function is efficient if its decision does not allow any further welfare enhancement (making all agents weakly better off and at least one better off). It is consistent if any local component (a community and the location of public facility for this community) of its global decision coincides with the local decision made by applying the function for this community only.
We offer simple necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency and decentralizability of efficient decisionsà la the first and the second welfare theorems. Next, building on a constructive argument used by Barberà and Beviá (2002) in their proof of Proposition 1, we define an algorithm that can be used to design efficient and consistent collective decision functions.
Our conditions for efficiency are composed of the following four axioms: no-envy (everyone weakly prefers the location in his own community to the location in any other community), local stability (there is no community where some members voluntarily move out and all remaining members agree on relocating their facility), and two diversity conditions, location diversity and community diversity.
The decentralizability result is obtained, using strong Nash equilibrium, in a game of community division and local public goods provision, similar to the game considered by Weber (1997a, 1997b ). 2 Our conditions for efficiency play a critical role in proving this decentralizability result and existence of efficient and consistent collective decision functions.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. We define our model and basic concepts in Section 2. In Section 3, we offer necessary and sufficient conditions for 1 A simpler model of locating two public facilities is studied by Miyagawa (2001) and Ehlers (2002 Ehlers ( , 2003 . 2 As in Weber (1997a, 1997b) , players are partitioned into communities each of which consists of players with the same strategy choice. However, our model differs crucially from theirs in that there is no externality or rivalry and the number of communities that can form is exogenous. Considering this game, we study the relationship between efficient decisions and strong Nash equilibria, while the main objective of Weber (1997a, 1997b) is to study conditions for existence of strong Nash equilibria in a more general environment than ours. efficiency (Section 3.1), and decentralizability of efficient decisions (Section 3.2). In Section 4, we show existence of efficient and consistent functions. Proofs of some results are provided in the appendix.
The Model and Basic Concepts
We consider the following collective decision problem. There is a set of agents. These agents have to be divided into a fixed number of subsets, called communities, and for each of these communities, a location for a local public facility has to be decided. A location is represented by a real number and the real line R is the set of possible locations. We consider these problems in a variable population environment and use natural numbers in N to label agents. Let P ⊆ N be the set of potential agents. A population is a finite subset of P. Let N be the set of all populations. Given a population N ∈ N and a number of communitiesk ∈ N withk ≤ |N|, let Π N,k be the set of profiles ofk-subsets, (C 1 , · · · ,C¯k), which constitute a partition of N. An N/k-decision is a list ofk-communities, (C 1 , · · · ,C¯k) ∈ Π(N,k), and the locations of public facilities for these communities, (x 1 , · · · , x¯k) ∈ (R ∪ {ν})¯k, where ν means "no location (or no public facility)". Let Z N,k be the set of
be the pair of community-k and the location for community-k. For simplicity, each N/k-decision z ∈ Z(N,k) is labeled in such a way that
In what follows, we use indices h, i, j for agents and indices k, l, m for communities. Components of z and z are denoted by
Each agent has a preference relation over Z. We assume that each agent cares about only the location of the public facility for the community he belongs to: that is, for all z, z ∈ Z, if i ∈ C k , i ∈ C l , and x k = x l , then z and z are indifferent for i. Thus in our model, agents have no preference over community members or community sizes. Under this assumption, preferences over Z can be described as preferences over the set of locations R ∪ {ν}. The generic notation for a preference relation for agent i is R i . The strict and the indifferent counterparts of R i are denoted by P i and I i respectively. For each x, x ∈ R ∪ {ν}, we write x P i x when agent i prefers x to x ; x I i x when the two are indifferent; x R i x when x P i x or x I i x .
Furthermore, we assume that each agent i has a single-peaked preference relation R i over R ∪ {ν}, that is, there is the peak location p(R i ) ∈ R such that for each x, x ∈ R, if x < x ≤ p(R i ) or p(R i ) ≤ x < x , x P i x , and that for each x ∈ R, x P i ν (thus having a local public facility wherever it is located is better than not having one). Let R be the set of single-peaked preferences. For each N ∈ N , let R N be the set of profiles of single-peaked preferences of agents in N.
For each population N ∈ N , a problem for N is characterized by a list of preferences of agents in N, R ∈ R N , and a number of communities to form,k ∈ N with k ≤ |N|. Let D N ⊆ R N × N be the set of all these problems for N.
the list ofk-communities in ϕ(R,k) and ϕ L R,k is the list ofk-locations in ϕ R,k .
We now state two main axioms of social choice functions, which are crucial in this paper. Given N ∈ N ,k ∈ N, and
at R, if all agents weakly prefer z to z and at least one agent prefers z to z : that is, for each i ∈ N and each k, l = 1, · · · ,k with i ∈ C k ∩ C l , x k R i x l , and for some j ∈ N and m, n = 1, · · · ,k with j ∈ C m ∩ C n , x m P i x n . An N/k-decision is efficient if there is no Pareto improvement of the decision.
Efficiency. For each N ∈ N , each R ∈ R N , and eachk ∈ N, there is no Pareto improvement of ϕ(R,k) at R. (2002) is a basic consistency requirement between (global) decisions for the whole population and local decisions for individual communities. Suppose that after an N/k-decision is made, each community can reassess its own location. The next axiom says that the original N/k-decision should remain intact after the community-wise reassessment.
The next axiom introduced by Barberà and Beviá

Consistency. For each
A social choice function satisfies self-selection consistency (Barberà and Beviá 2002) if it satisfies both efficiency and consistency.
Efficiency
Conditions for Efficiency
In this section, we identify necessary and sufficient conditions for efficiency.
As pointed out by Barberà and Beviá (2002) , the following are two necessary conditions for efficiency. To define them, we use the following notation. For each N ∈ N , each R ∈ R N , and each S ⊆ N, let R S ≡ (R i ) i∈S . And let
We call P (R S ) the local Pareto set for community S with R S .
For each N ∈ N and each R,
The two conditions are not sufficient for efficiency. This is shown by the three examples below. These examples will also provide us some insight into what additional conditions are needed for efficiency.
, and x 2 ≡ 3. Then if we move agent 2 into community-2 and change the location for community-1 to x 1 ≡ 1, agent 1 is better off and agents 2 and 3 are indifferent. Therefore, z is not efficient.
The Pareto improvement of z in the example is possible because for a community (community 2 in the example), the location is not between the peaks of members for whom it is the preferred location among all locations in z. Such Pareto improvement does not exist if z satisfies the next condition.
be the set of members of community-k who prefer the location for this community to any different location for other communities. Note that for each
to other communities they weakly prefer and changing the location for community-k to the closest location in P(R C 0 k (R,z) ) improves welfare of all remaining members in community-k without hurting anyone else. The next axiom guarantees that there be no such Pareto improvement. An N/k-decision z satisfies local stability if for each
Clearly, this axiom implies local efficiency but the converse does not hold as shown by Example 1. The next example shows that the combination of no-envy and local stability is not sufficient for efficiency.
, and x 2 ≡ 2. Note that z satis-fies both no-envy and local stability. However, z violates efficiency because there is a Pareto improvement z ≡ ((C 1 , x 1 ), (C 2 , x 2 )) defined as follows:
The N/k-decision z in Example 2 admits a Pareto improvement because there is a community (community-1 in the example) with more than one peaks of the members and its location is identical to the location for another community (community-2 in the example). Then by diversifying locations and regrouping communities, we can achieve a Pareto improvement. Community- 
whenever there exists a heterogeneous community, say, k ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, in z, its location x k differs from the location for any other community. There are situations where picking the same location for different communities is inevitable: for example, when all agents have the same peak but they are to be divided into more than one communities. Location diversity, then, has no bite.
Adding location diversity to no-envy and local stability, however, is not sufficient for efficiency as the next example shows.
k=1 be defined as follows:
Note that z satisfies no-envy, local stability, and location diversity. However, z violates efficiency because there is a Pareto improvement z ≡ (C k , x k ) 3 k=1 defined as follows:
The N/k-decision z in Example 3 admits a Pareto improvement because there is a heterogeneous community (community-1 in the example) and at the same time, there are two other homogeneous communities with the same peaks (communities 2 and 3 in the example). Then after diversifying communities by combining members of the two homogeneous communities in z and partitioning the heterogeneous community into two, we can achieve a Pareto improvement. Thus we need the following condition. An N/k-decision z ≡ (C k , x k )¯k k=1 satisfies community diversity, if whenever there is a heterogeneous community, there are no two other homogeneous communities with the same peak of their members, that is, for each pair of distinct homogeneous communities k, l ∈ {1, . . . ,k}, P(R C k ) = P(R C l ). When a decision satisfies both location diversity and community diversity, we say that it satisfies diversity.
Adding community diversity to the three conditions above, we finally get a necessary and sufficient condition for efficiency which is shown in our first result. The following lemmas are used in proving this result.
Throughout the lemmas, we fix N ∈ N ,k ∈ N, and R ∈ R N and assumek ≥ 2. 
The same argument can be used to prove the second inequalities.
Since by local efficiency and Lemma 1,
This proves the first two inequalities and part (i). Parts (ii)-(v) are obtained easily from part (i), no-envy, and location diversity.
and diversity at R. If there exists at least one heterogeneous community in z, then all locations are strictly ordered, that is,
If at least one of P R C k and P R C k+1 is not a singleton, then by Lemma 2 and local efficiency, x k < x k+1 . Suppose both P R C k and P R C k+1 are singleton. By local efficiency,
be an N/k-decision satisfying no-envy, local stability, and diversity at R. Assume that all locations in z are strictly ordered.
is another N/k-decision such that for some l 0 ∈ {2, . . . ,k}, x l 0 < x l 0 and for each i ∈ C l 0 , z R i z, then there exist l 1 < l 0 and j 1 ∈ C l 0 such that j 1 ∈ C l 1 and x l 1 < x l 1 .
Proof. By local stability, there exists j 1 ∈ C l 0 such that x l 0 ≤ p R j 1 
and for each
This completes the proof of part (i). The proof of part (ii) is similar.
Now we are ready to show the first result.
Theorem 1.
A decision is efficient if and only if it satisfies no-envy, local stability, location diversity, and community diversity. And the four axioms are independent.
Proof. It is easy to prove that efficiency implies the four axioms, and so we omit this part. In what follows, we prove the converse. Throughout the proof, we fix N ∈ N , k ∈ N, and R ∈ R N . Let z ≡ (C k , x k )¯k k=1 be an N/k-decision satisfying no-envy, local stability, and diversity. Suppose by contradiction that there exists a Pareto improve-
. Let i ∈ N be an agent who prefers z to z. Let k and l 0 be such that i ∈ C k and i ∈ C l 0 . Then x k = p (R i ) and P R C k is not a singleton. Then by Lemma 3, locations in z are strictly ordered, that is,
Assume p (R i ) < x k (the symmetric argument applies for x k < p (R i )). We derive a contradiction for each of the following two cases.
Sincek is finite, then the iterative application of part (i) of Lemma 4 leads to x k < x¯k. By local stability, there exists h ∈ C¯k such that p (R h ) ≥ x¯k and for each m ≤k, if x m = x¯k, then x¯k P h x m . Hence by (1), for each m =k, x¯k P h x m . For each m ≤k, since x m ≤ x k < x¯k ≤ p (R h ), then x¯k P h x m , contradicting the initial assumption.
Sincek is finite, then the iterative application of part (ii) of Lemma 4 leads to x 1 < x 1 . By local stability, there exists h ∈ C 1 such that p (R h ) ≤ x 1 and for each m ≤k, if x m = x 1 , then x 1 P h x m . Hence by (1), for each m = 1,
Finally, independence of the four axioms is shown by the above three Examples 1-3 and Example 4 below.
k=1 be the N/k -decision defined as follows:
, and x k P j x k+1 .
Theorem 2. A decision is efficient if and only if it passes the neighbor test.
Proof. Throughout the proof, we fix N ∈ N ,k ∈ N, and R ∈ R N and consider the nontrivial case |{p
Then by Theorem 1, z satisfies no-envy, local stability, and diversity. By Lemma 2-(i),
Neighbor no-envy and neighbor stability follow directly from no-envy and local stability.
To prove the converse, let z ≡ (C k , x k )¯k k=1 be an N/k-decision passing the neighbor test. Note that by no-overlap,
This implies location diversity and community diversity. To show no-envy, let k be such that 2 
, and x k P j x k+1 . Then by (2), for each l = k, x k P i x l and z) ). Hence z satisfies local stability. Therefore, by Theorem 1, z satisfies efficiency. Whenk = 2, the neighbor test reduces to a substantially simpler condition as stated in Miyagawa (2001).
The Game of Community Division and Location
In this section, we consider a simple game similar to the local public good provision game considered by Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1998).
Definition 1 (The Game of Community Division and Location). Given a set of agents
N ∈ N and a required number of communitiesk ∈ N, let G be a game form with the following strategy sets and the outcome function. For each i ∈ N, let S i ≡ R be i's strategy set with generic element s i , interpreted as i's proposal for the location of the local public facility in his community. Let S ≡ × i∈N S i be the set of strategy profiles with generic element s. When the total number of locations proposed by agents at s is less than or equal to the required levelk, agents with the same proposals constitute communities and locations are determined by their proposals. Otherwise, communities are formed in the same way but no public facility can be provided for any community. Formally, let g : S → Z be the outcome function defined as follows: for each strategy
k=1 is a partition of N and for each k
A strategy profile s ∈ S is a strong Nash equilibrium in (G, R), if there exist no T ⊆ N and s T ∈ S T such that for each i ∈ T, g(s T , s −T ) R i g(s) and for some j ∈ T, g(s T , s −T ) P j g(s)
. 3 The next result is that the set of efficient decisions can be implemented in strong Nash equilibrium by this game form G. Theorem 1 plays a crucial role in proving this result.
Theorem 3.
Let N ∈ N andk ∈ N. For each R ∈ R N , an N/k-decision is efficient if and only if it is a strong Nash equilibrium outcome of the game of community division and location.
Proof. Let R ∈ R N andk ∈ N be given. By definition, every strong Nash equilibrium outcome is efficient. In order to prove the converse, let z ≡ (C k , x k )¯k k=1 be an efficient N/k-decision. Then by Theorem 1, z satisfies no-envy, local stability, and diversity. Let s be such that for each k ∈ {1, · · · ,k} and each i ∈ C k , s i ≡ x k . We only have to show that s is a strong Nash equilibrium. When |{p(R i ) : i ∈ N}| ≤k, every agent gets his peak location and so s is, clearly, a strong Nash equilibrium. Assume that |{p(R i ) : i ∈ N}| >k. Then there exists a heterogeneous community. Hence by Lemma 3,
by contradiction that there exist T ⊆ N and s T such that for all i ∈ T, g(s T , s −T ) R i z and for some j ∈ T, g(s T , s −T ) P j z. Let z ≡ g(s T , s −T ).
Since ν is the worst outcome for everyone,
Proof. Suppose by contradiction that for each k ∈ {1, · · · ,k}, T k = C k . Then |{s i : i ∈ T } ∪ {s j : j ∈ N\T }| ≥k. Therefore, by (3), |{s i : i ∈ T } ∪ {s j : j ∈ N\T }| =k. Then {s i : i ∈ T } ∪ {s j : j ∈ N\T } = {x 1 , · · · , x¯k}. Therefore, since z satisfies no-envy, there is no i ∈ T such that z P i z, contradicting the previous assumption on T and s T .
Since {k ∈ {1, · · · ,k} : T k = C k } = / 0, we may write this set as {k 1 , · · · , kr} for somē r ≥ 1 where
Proof. By (3), each i ∈ N eventually gets a location that is chosen by himself. Therefore for each r and each i ∈ T k r , s i R i x k r . Let r ∈ {1, · · · ,r}. By local stability,
equilibrium. Konishi, Le Breton, and Weber (1999) study the relationship between strong Nash equilibrium and "coalition-proof Nash equilibrium" in the context of common agency games.
Note that for all k = k r , x k r P j r x k and x k r P i r x k . Also note that by Lemma Proof. Suppose by contradiction that for all r ∈ {1, · · · ,r}, s i r = x k r . Then at z , each agent in T gets a location that is a location in z. Therefore, since z satisfies noenvy, then there is no i ∈ T such that z P i z, contradicting the earlier assumption on T and s T .
To complete the proof, let r be such that s i r = x k r . Then by Claim 2, s i r < s j r . Therefore, by Claim 3,
composed of more thank elements, contradicting (3).
Self-Selection Consistent Social Choice
In this section, we provide an algorithm that can be used to construct a large family of efficient and consistent, namely self-selection consistent, social choice functions. 
Proof. The proof for the "if" part is evident. In order to prove the "only if" part, let
be a pair of a community and the location for its public facility chosen by ϕ (·)
follows from the fact that any single location function f (·) with the stated condition should satisfy f (·) = ϕ L (·, 1).
The next example shows existence of an efficient and consistent social choice function using the minimal peak function f min (·).
Example 5 (An efficient and consistent function). For each N ∈ N and each
. It is easily shown by Theorem 2 and Proposition 1 that ϕ (·) satisfies both efficiency and consistency.
It can be shown that alternative constructions obtained by replacing f min (·) with some other single location functions, e.g. f mean (·), may not give an efficient social choice function.
In what follows, we provide an algorithm that will allow us to construct an efficient and consistent function based on any single location function with the following two mild conditions. A single location function f satisfies efficiency if for each N ∈ N and each R ∈ R N , f (R) ∈ P(R). It satisfies participation if for each N ∈ N , each i / ∈ N,
and Beviá 2002).
Leftward Adjustment Algorithm. 4 Let N ∈ N , R ∈ R N , andk ∈ N. Let z be an N/kdecision and f (·) a single location function. To simplify our notation, for each S ⊆ N, Consider the preference profile R of agents in N depicted in the figure.
The leftward adjustment algorithm with initial decision (({1}, 0) , ({2}, 1) , ({3}, 2) , ({4, 5, 6, 7}, 10)) leads to four iterations of loop 3, as explained in Tables 1-4 , and yields the following efficient final decision:
We refer to the combination of Stages 5.1, 5. 
Right stability:
then the leftward adjustment of z based on f converges to an efficient N/k-decision.
Proof. See the appendix.
To better understand how the algorithm works, consider the following example:
Community 1 Community 2 Community 3 Community 4
Initial decision {1} 0 The first iteration of loop 3 in Example 6. The set in each cell gives composition of the corresponding community and the real number in each cell is the location for the community. The first row gives the initial decision and the last row gives the final decision of this iteration. 
The first iteration of loop 3:
It is explained in Table 1 and yields the following decision:
In this process, neither loop 1 nor loop 2 is triggered as explained by blank cells in rows 6 and 8 of Table 1 .
The second iteration of loop 3: It is explained in Table 2 obtained after the first iteration. It yields
Loop 2 is triggered once because l = 3 <k (= 4) as explained in rows 8-11. Loop 1 is triggered within the first iteration of loop 2, which is explained in row 9.
The third iteration of loop 3: It is explained in Table 3 and yields
In this process, loop 2 is triggered twice in rows 8-10 first and rows 11-13 second. However, loop 1 is not triggered as explained by blank cells in rows 6, 9, and 12.
The fourth iteration of loop 3: It is explained in Table 4 and starts with the decision from the third iteration. Note that at this decision, no agent weakly prefers the location for the left adjacent community to the location for his own community, which means 
It is easy to show that for each R,k ∈ D, LA f R,k = / 0. 5 Using any decision in LA f R,k as the initial decision in the leftward adjustment algorithm and associating with R,k an outcome of the algorithm, we can define a self-selection 5 Barberà and Beviá (2002) shows this by the following construction. If the number of peaks is less thank, the proof is trivial. Suppose |{p(R i ) : i ∈ N}| ≥k. Let r be the number of peaks (r ≥k). Denote peaks in {p(R i ) : i ∈ N} in the increasing order by p 1 < · · · < p r . Then we can partition N intok communities (C 1 , · · · ,C¯k) as follows:
Every member in community-k, for each k = 1, · · · ,k − 1, gets his peak location and so both (4) and (5) hold. Since f satisfies efficiency and each community-k with k ≤k − 1 has only one peak, f (R C k ) = p k (= x k ). Finally, no-overlap holds by construction of z. Proof. The result follows immediately from the definition of the leftward adjustment algorithm and Propositions 1 and 2.
Note that the leftward adjustment algorithm treats agents "symmetrically". Thus using f (·) and ψ (·) with the same symmetric treatment property, we can construct a large family of social choice functions satisfying "anonymity" as well as efficiency and consistency.
Proposition 2 and Theorem 4 improve Proposition 1 in Barberà and Beviá (2002) by showing existence of a larger family of self-selection consistent functions that can be obtained through the leftward adjustment algorithm. We show that any selection function ψ (·) of the correspondence LA f (·) can be used in the algorithm to obtain a self-selection consistent function, while Barberà and Beviá (2002) use one special ψ (·) (decisions made by this function are explained in Footnote 5). Also by virtue of our conditions for efficiency, we are able to give a formal proof that the leftward adjustment algorithm leads to an efficient decision. The proof of Proposition 1 in Barberà and Beviá (2002) only shows that their construction leads to an outcome that satisfies local efficiency and no-envy, which are necessary but not sufficient for efficiency. To give more explanation in this regard, let us return to Example 6 and explain how we modify their construction.
In what follows, we use the same notation as used in the proof of Proposition 1 in Barberà and Beviá (2002) . Their construction applied to Example 6 starts with the initial decision given by C 1 1 = {1}, x 1 1 = 0, C 1 2 = {2}, x 1 2 = 1, C 1 3 = {3}, x 1 3 = 2, and C 1 4 = {4, 5, 6, 7}, x 1 4 = 10. Since agent 6 in the fourth group prefers x 1 3 = 2 to x 1 4 = 10, there is an envy and C 3 = C 1 3 ∪ {5, 6} (see p.272 of Barberà and Beviá 2002 ; in this example, k = 4 and C k−1 = C 3 ). Note that f (R C 3 ) = 11/3 and there is no agent in C 4 whose peak is between x 1 3 = 2 and f (R C 3 ) = 11/3. Thus the process in lines 2-17 of p.272 is not needed. So C 2 3 = C 3 = C 1 3 ∪ {5, 6} = {3, 5, 6}, x 2 3 = 11/3, C 2 4 = {4, 7}, x 2 4 = 31/2. And C 2 1 = {1}, x 2 1 = 0, C 2 2 = {2}, and x 2 2 = 1. Then there is no-envy and the process stops. However, the outcome (({1}, 0), ({2}, 1), ({3, 5, 6}, 11/3), ({4, 7}, 31/2)) is not efficient because moving agent 3 from community 3 to community 2 (note that 1 I 3 11/3) and changing the location for community 3 from 11/3 to 4 makes both agents 5 and 6 better off without making anyone else worse off.
Therefore, there needs to be some change in their construction. The first change we can think of is the following: instead of checking no-envy as the stopping criterion, we check what is in Stage 2 in our algorithm. Unfortunately, this does not resolve the deficiency fully. To see this, let us continue with the above example. Since there is an agent, agent 3, who feels indifferent between his location and the left location (and agent 3 is the only such agent), we reiterate the whole process as in Barberà and Beviá (2002) . Now we have to set k, at the top of p.272 in their paper, to be equal to 3. Then we obtain C 3 1 = {1}, x 3 1 = 0, C 3 2 = C 2 2 ∪ {3} = {2, 3}, x 3 2 = 3/2, C 3 3 = {5, 6}, The change we made in this regard is that in our algorithm, we combine what might have been two or more iterations in Barberà and Beviá (2002) in one iteration of loop 3 (loop 1 and loop 2 are within loop 3). This guarantees monotonic movement of locations in every iteration as shown in Step 1 of the proof of Proposition 2 (so it resolves the problem mentioned in the previous paragraph).
Our Proposition 2 shows, in addition, that the algorithm can be used with any initial allocation satisfying the three properties, no-overlap, no-right-envy, and right stability. This gives more power to the result.
A Proof of Proposition 2
In this section, we prove Proposition 2.
The following two lemmas in Barberà and Beviá (2002) are useful.
Lemma 5 (Barberà and Beviá 2002). Consider a single location function f satisfying
The same argument applies for each iteration of loop 1 and at the end of loop 1, we get
